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ABSTRACT 
Despite the importance of social dialogue for the European social model, there has been little 
attention to the factors that account for social partner engagement with European social dialogue. On 
the basis of data from 28 European sectoral social dialogue committees this article investigates 
structural factors that account for the conclusion of European sectoral social dialogue agreements. It 
is found that actors’ organisational density is a necessary but not sufficient factor for successful 
European social dialogue and four different categories of sectoral social partner engagement with 
European social dialogue are identified. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The realization and functioning of a European social market economy which simultaneously promotes 
sustainable economic growth and social cohesion is also based and dependent on the functioning of 
social dialogue, i.e. on consultations, negotiations and joint actions between social partners (European 
Commission, 2015). Though social dialogue exhibits a high degree of institutional and organisational 
heterogeneity across European countries, it exists in all European Union (EU) member states 
(Marginson and Sisson, 2004). Even though social dialogue in the EU is deeply rooted in national 
structures, it has also increasingly taken place at European-level.1 In particular, since the launch of an 
institutionalized European social dialogue in 1985, European social partners have attempted to 
simultaneously ensure the fair treatment of workers and foster the competitiveness of businesses in an 
increasingly integrated European market (Welz, 2008). The European Commission (EC) indeed sees 
social dialogue as important to its current objectives, and social partners have assumed a role in the 
‘Europe 2020’ strategy and new ‘European semester’ system of governance (Meardi and Marginson, 
2014). 
Despite literature on the outcomes of European social dialogue, i.e. on the joint texts 
produced in European level social dialogue (Degryse, 2015; European Commission, 2010; Pochet et 
al., 2009) and the quality of implementation outcomes (Prosser, 2012; Prosser and Perin, 2015), little 
is known about the structural factors that account for the participation of social partners in the 
dialogue (Keller and Sörries, 1998; Leisink, 2002), and especially since enlargement of the EU in 
2004. Against the background that the EC recently emphasized the importance of adequate structures 
                                                          
1 In the following article we refer to national social dialogue, or national level social dialogue, to 
describe country-specific forms and structures of social dialogue which, depending on the country, 
can take place at either company, sector, or national level (or at a combination of different levels).  
For national social dialogue, in the sense that the domain of social dialogue covers the whole country, 
we use the term country-wide social dialogue.  
of European social partner organisations and their national affiliates (European Commission, 2014), 
this article therefore aims to identify necessary and sufficient factors for the engagement of social 
partners at European level social dialogue by focusing on one major forum of institutionalized 
interaction, i.e. on European sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDCs). Against the background 
that in recent years European level social partner institutions became increasingly contested and 
reformed (Marginson and Welz, 2015), this endeavour will not only contribute to academic literature, 
but will also shine new light on how social partners can better contribute to the challenges of 
European integration. 
The article is organized as follows. First it outlines the background and structural framework 
of European sectoral social dialogue and reviews its role and outcomes. On the basis of this a four-
point framework is derived that conceptualizes different forms of social partner engagement in 
SSDCs. The paper’s methodological and empirical strategies are then described, and findings are 
consequently set out. A conclusion that classifies sectoral social dialogue regimes on the basis of the 
analytical framework and discusses the impact of the results on European social dialogue’s prospects 
is finally reached. 
 
2. THE IDEA AND FRAMEWORK OF THE SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE 
 
In the majority of Western European countries, the sector is (still) the traditional and predominant 
level at which social partners organize and conclude collective agreements on work and employment 
related issues (European Commission, 2015). Though in recent decades sectoral agreements in 
Western European countries have tended to fragment by a steady process of decentralization of 
collective bargaining (Hyman, 2001; Marginson, 2015; Marginson et al., 2003) and sectoral dialogue 
remains, with a few exceptions, ‘poorly’ developed in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
(Meardi, 2007), sectoral social dialogue in Western Europe still plays an important role in the 
governance of work and employment (Meardi and Marginson, 2014).  
Against the background of the existence of sectoral social dialogue structures in many 
European countries, European public authorities have also promoted the sector as a key level of 
European social dialogue (Dufrense et al., 2006; Falkner et al., 2005; Keller and Sörries, 1998; Welz, 
2008). A particular concern has been fostering SSDCs; these institutions were launched in the 15 
member states of the EU (EU-15) in 1998 to replace the existing structure of joint committees and 
informal working groups.  
SSDCs are forums where national sectoral social partners exchange information on a wide 
range of social and work related issues and which also enjoy the right to negotiate and conclude EU-
level agreements.2 Such committees are established for those sectors in which organisations 
representing the interests of workers and employers at European level fulfil representativeness criteria 
(European Commission, 1998), measured by their structural capacity to engage effectively in SSDCs. 
In line with the procedures for EU-level bargaining outlined in Article 154 and 155 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), sectoral social partners may conclude agreements to 
be implemented either autonomously by social partners or by legally binding Council Directive. 
Sectoral social partners may also issue bipartite joint texts; such output takes the form of process 
oriented texts (codes of conduct, frameworks of actions, guidelines), follow-up reports and joint 
opinion, declarations and tools yet is of a non-legally binding character (Welz, 2008). 
SSDCs have achieved some notable successes. The institutions have spread to over forty 
European sectors, and have produced hundreds of joint texts and fifteen collective agreements. These 
collective agreements have been concluded in a range of sectors and concern topics as diverse as 
working time, lifelong learning and health and safety. Though some agreements have been 
implemented autonomously, most have been implemented via Council Directive (Degryse, 2015; 
European Commission, 2015). SSDCs have nonetheless also been the subject of critique. 
Discrepancies in sectoral adoption of SSDCs have long been noted, with many highlighting the 
                                                          
2 In the following we use the term national sectoral partners to describe employers’ organisations and 
trade unions which represent the interests of their constituencies within their home country. 
 
absence of SSDCs from certain European sectors (Leisink, 2002; Pochet et al., 2009). The integrity of 
SSDC output has additionally been disparaged (De Boer et al., 2005; Keller, 2003). Not only has the 
paucity of SSDC agreements in comparison to national sectoral industrial relations regimes been 
commented upon (Pochet, 2005), but the quality of SSDC joint texts has been belittled.3 Such texts, 
the criticism goes, are of weak strength and often the subject of underwhelming implementation 
(Falkner et al., 2005; Keller, 2008; Keller and Weber, 2011; Léonard and Perin, 2011). In addition to 
this it is often argued that certain SSDC outcomes concern topics that are rather peripheral to the 
employment relationship (Keller and Sörries, 1998; Prosser, 2012; Prosser and Perin, 2015). 
There is no doubt that SSDCs have achieved a wide range of outputs yet that the texts 
produced differ in their status and follow-up provisions (Degryse, 2015; Dufresne et al., 2006). The 
most important type of outcome is certainly ‘agreements’ (European Commission, 2012), which are 
concluded in accordance with procedures outlined in the TFEU (Article 154 and 155). Such 
agreements are implemented via legally-binding Council Directive or non-legally binding national 
‘procedures and practices’ for social dialogue and thus affect the everyday working lives of 
employers and employees. The impact of joint texts is generally not extensive. Though some may 
achieve significant impact, their lack of specified implementation procedures and occasionally minor 
subject matter mean the effects of others are slighter. The focus of this study is investigation of the 
factors that promote the conclusion of agreements rather than assessment of quality of output, as we 
have stated there is sufficient literature on the latter issue, yet the superior quality of agreements mean 
they are privileged as dependent variable in the analyses. 
Previous research on EU-level social dialogue outcomes has stressed that differences in the 
quality and quantity of SSDC outcomes rests on the interest of actors, expressed through external 
factors such as policy developments at European level which incentivize social partners to engage in 
European social dialogue so as to influence eventual policy (Leisink, 2002; Smisman, 2008). Even 
though these factors matter and they are interrelated with structural influences (Léonard et al., 2011), 
                                                          
3 Analogous with our definition of national sectoral partners we use the term national sectoral 
industrial relations to describe sector level industrial relations within countries. 
our analysis concentrates on the structural capacity of social partners. There is evidence that the 
structure of some industrial relations systems constrains the ability of social partners to conclude 
binding agreements at national level and the same is hypothesized to be true at EU-level (Keller and 
Sörries, 1998; Leisink, 2002; Perin and Léonard, 2016). 
There are several properties of sectoral industrial relations systems which potentially 
influence the ability of social partners to negotiate agreements. Most notably, there is the associational 
strengths and legitimacy of social partners involved in social dialogue which is traditionally 
considered in literature to be a prime determinant of social dialogue outcomes (Crouch, 1982; 
Ebbinghaus, 2002; Furåker and Bengtsson, 2013). Thus, one very important property of industrial 
relations systems is trade union density which is the source of trade union strength and legitimacy 
(Hyman, 1997) and expresses the share of employees who are members of a trade union compared to 
the total number of employees in the domain. In fact there are good reasons for considering trade 
union density (i) to be a key factor in promoting effective social dialogue as a ‘sufficiently’ high 
union density has been shown to be crucial in compelling employers to engage in social dialogue 
(Crouch, 1982). Strong employers’ organisations (ii) also appear an important factor in promoting 
effective social dialogue and therefore are also likely to be important to the conclusion of European 
agreements. The coordination of individual employers’ interests via employers’ organisations has 
been a traditional precondition to successful multi-employer bargaining, and membership density is a 
key indicator of employers’ organisation strength (Traxler et al., 2001) which also potentially 
influences capacity to negotiate agreements. There is little reason to think that this would not apply to 
European sectoral level since strong social partner organisations are seen as a prerequisite for 
effective engagement at European level (European Commission, 1998). A third key factor is 
collective bargaining coverage (iii); this is an indicator of the relevance of collective bargaining 
(Traxler and Brandl, 2011) and the capacity of actors to govern work and employment related issues. 
A fourth potentially relevant factor is the ‘experience’ of social partner interaction which can be 
operationalized by frequency of meetings (iv). Jacobsson (2004) emphasizes how involving national 
actors in EU-level policy cooperation procedures impacts upon their willingness to participate in 
European governance, suggesting that the experience of participation and achieving consensus on 
policies can contribute to the conclusion of agreements. SSDCs should meet at least once a year 
(European Commission, 1998) and usually between three and four meetings take place a year 
however, depending on the work-program and policies SSDCs are tackling, they can meet more 
frequently (European Commission, 2010: 98). Given the existence of such precedents in literature, 
there is good reason to examine the relationship between meeting frequency and the conclusion of 
SSDC agreements. 
According to the European Commission (1998) the ability of social partners to engage 
effectively in SSDCs and to negotiate agreements at EU-level is grounded in the structural capacity of 
social partners to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the national level. To test this, 
structure- and actor-related factors are combined by comparing the structural capacity of social 
partners in the EU member states and their engagement at EU-level across 28 sectors to explain the 
outcome SSDC agreement using the framework outlined below. 
 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations in European member states are not only embedded in 
different economic and institutional contexts (Crouch, 1982), but they also have different preferences. 
With the creation of the single market, trade unions increasingly have to deal with pressures 
emanating from beyond national boundaries. The existence of such pressures means they need to 
address work and employment issues at the European level and coordination at EU-level can be 
regarded as a joint effort to minimize competitive pressures exerted on national workforces (Larsson, 
2012).  
There is a body of literature on the reasons why social partners engage in social dialogue at 
different levels (Leisink and Hyman, 2005) and also on the range of interdependencies between social 
partners at national and EU-level (Beyers, 2002). This work draws upon such studies, specifically on 
the work of Beyers (2002) who investigates the emergence of EU-level institutions and the impact 
they had on the integration of national interest associations in EU-level policy making. On the basis of 
the relationship between the structural capacity and embeddedness of social partners in national 
dialogue and their EU-level engagement, four categories are derived.  
Based on the dimensions describing the structural capacity of social partners, i.e. trade union 
density, employer density, collective bargaining coverage and frequency of meetings, four separate 
categorizations of EU-level engagement are identified. The four different categories of the 
interrelationship between the structural capacity of actors and SSDC engagement are illustrated in 
Table 1. The aim is to assign sectors to each of the four categories and to identify configurations of 
factors that are associated with SSDC agreements, i.e. outcomes. However, not many sectors utilize 
their SSDC engagement potential effectively (European Commission, 2010: 98). This may result from 
the fact that the advantages of influencing policy making at the European level may increase overall 
transaction costs (Marginson and Sisson, 2004) or from the ability of social partners to achieve 
efficient outcomes for their members at national level. The main question therefore concerns the 
configuration of the four dimensions representing the engagement category that is most effective with 
respect to the agreements concluded and scope and coverage of sectors. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
A first category of social dialogue is ‘simultaneous engagement’ and involves actors attempting to 
realise their interests at both national and EU-level. The simultaneous engagement category assumes 
that if trade unions and employers are an integral part of national social dialogue systems, with high 
social partner density rates and adequate structures for collective bargaining, they are likely to engage 
in European social dialogue so as to attempt to control EU-level policy-outcomes. Sectors in which 
there are high levels of social partner density and collective bargaining coverage and high levels of 
engagement at European-level might be assigned to this category.  
A second category of social dialogue is ‘traditional’ and occurs in sectors in which actors are 
involved in well-established systems of national sectoral dialogue yet, as a result of their ability to 
fulfil objectives at national level, have limited interest in engaging in European-level social dialogue. 
In service sectors, for example, it has been observed (Bechter et al., 2012) that social partners exhibit 
only limited motivation to participate in EU-level policy making and rather try to put their own 
strategies in place to retain or gain competitive advantage. Sectors in which there are high levels of 
social partner density and collective bargaining coverage and low levels of engagement at European-
level would be assigned to this category. 
A third category of social dialogue is ‘compensation’ and occurs in sectors that are 
characterised by underdeveloped national social dialogue structures. To pursue the interests of their 
members, social partners seek access to EU-level policy-making forums so as to ‘compensate’ for 
their weaknesses at national-level (Ronit and Schneider, 2000). Sectors in which there are low levels 
of social partner density and collective bargaining coverage and high levels of engagement at 
European-level would be assigned to this category. 
A fourth category of social dialogue is ‘disengagement’ and occurs when actors are 
disengaged at both national and European-level. On one hand the actors are weak and lack appropriate 
social dialogue structures to engage effectively at national level and, on the other hand, such 
inadequate structures hamper the ability of social partners to realise objectives at EU-level. Sectors in 
which there are low levels of social partner density and collective bargaining coverage and low levels 
of engagement at European-level would be assigned to this category. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Methodology 
Previous literature on SSDCs outcomes was largely based on qualitative case study analyses 
investigating a single sector (Leisink, 2002; Lethbridge, 2011), country, or a limited number of 
sectors and/or countries (Dufresne et al., 2006; Keller and Sörries, 1998; Léonard et al., 2011). The 
problems inherent to previous literature is that the number of factors explaining outcomes is large 
relative to the small number of cases. This poses an obstacle to causal analysis (Edwards, 2005). For 
this reason a case-oriented comparative research design is applied that systematically seeks to 
establish a relationship between causally relevant conditions and a clearly specified outcome.  
We use Multi Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (MVQCA), see Cronqvist (2004), 
which is an analytical approach that investigates the relationship between the structural dimensions of 
social dialogue and the outcome of EU-level engagement. The central goal of MVQCA is to identify 
configurations of (interrelated) factors such as trade union density, employer density, collective 
bargaining coverage and frequency of meetings, to assess if different sector-specific configuration of 
conditions may lead to the same outcome. Interviews complement the data used in the MVQCA and 
therefore enhance the quality of case studies. In total six interviews which focused on the structural 
capacity and role of actors with key social dialogue representatives at the EU-level were conducted; 
these are the basis for the within-case analysis for the classification of social partners’ engagement.  
To study causal relationships with MVQCA, the factors need to be translated and coded in 
set-theoretic terms, i.e.: trade union density, employer density and collective bargaining coverage is 
measured on an ordinal scale by differentiating between low, medium, and high observations. For the 
frequency of meetings a binary scale (low, high) is used. The need to develop a coding scheme and 
thus a classification implies that a line has to be drawn. In order to draw this line in a meaningful way 
we base our coding on previous literature. A common coding strategy in MVQCA literature 
(Cronqvist, 2004), as well as in industrial relations literature (Traxler et al., 2001), is to make use of 
averages and categorise cases accordingly. As our unit of analysis is the sectoral level we are using 
averages across countries for sectoral indicators. We consequently consider average trade union 
density rates greater than 50 per cent to be high, and classify rates between 20 and 50 per cent as 
medium, and below 20 per cent as low. The selection of this threshold is consistent with previous 
studies (Bechter et al., 2012). For employers’ organisations, which typically have higher density rates 
than trade unions (Brandl and Lehr, 2016), we use a criterion of 60 per cent density for high and 
between 40 and 60 per cent for medium and below 40 per cent for low membership rates. For 
collective bargaining coverage, which is also typically higher than trade union density, we consider 
coverage above 80 per cent to be high, between 60 and 80 per cent medium and below 60 per cent to 
be low (Traxler et al., 2001). Since the EC provides financial support for the organisation of three 
SSDC meetings per year, we use a binary factor for frequency of meeting to distinguish between less 
than four meetings and equal or more than four meetings. For further details see notes in Table 2. 
The main objective of the analysis is to examine the relationships between the structural 
conditions and social partners’ engagement at the European level and the outcome of sectoral social 
dialogue (agreements). In MVQCA structural factors can be interpreted as sufficient if the outcome 
‘agreement’ always accompanies the condition; contrastingly a condition is necessary if the condition 
accompanies the outcome. As outlined before, the ability of social partners to engage effectively in 
SSDCs and to negotiate agreements at EU-level is grounded in the structural capacity of social 
partners in the EU. The study aims to show that agreements negotiated between social partners at the 
European-level are explained by multiple and complex configurations of conditions which are 
potentially necessary and/or sufficient.   
In the process of carrying out MVQCA, iterative research steps are involved so as to establish 
evidence based relationships between structural conditions and SSDC agreements. Basically, the 
identified contradictions lead us to carry out within-case analysis and interviews with representatives 
of European social partner organisations during March and April 2015 and May 2016 in order to 
understand the reasons for the sectors displaying contradictory outcomes. From a systematic 
comparison of the structural conditions with MVQCA it is possible to identify sectors which share the 
same characteristic (Table 2) and to identify necessary and/or sufficient configurations of conditions 
for the outcome ‘agreement’. Based on the configurations identified in the so called truth table the 
sectors were allocated into the respective categories specified in the analytical framework (Table 3). 
 4.2. Data 
The study relies on data obtained from cross-national and cross-sectoral studies of industrial relations 
systems in 27 member states of the EU (EU-27). Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, was not 
considered in the analysis as data is systematically missing. The data is drawn from the Eurofound 
sectoral social partner representativeness studies (see Eurofound, 2016).   
From the sectors for which sectoral representativeness studies exist until 2016, certain sectors 
were excluded from analysis for reasons of data availability and applicability. For some sectors there 
is a lack of available data on the main indicators of sectoral industrial relations. For other sectors data 
on the indicators is not applicable which was caused by high sectional overlaps of actors between 
different sectors. A full list of studied sectors with details is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. In 
sum, sector selection aims to guarantee that a representative set of SSDCs, which also includes a 
sufficiently high variance of sector-specific contextual properties such as, for example, differences in 
the exposedness of sectors to international competition, size and economic relevance, as well as role 
in EU policy developments (Keller and Sörries, 1998; Smisman, 2008), is considered. Furthermore, 
the selection of sectors also accounts for differences between the private and public sector. For 
example, trade union density is traditionally higher in the public sector and employers’ organisations 
density is lower (Bach and Bordogna, 2016). So as to test if the sample selection caused any bias in 
results, various tests of robustness were carried out by investigating different subsets of sectors. All 
these tests support the results.  
The study analyses the record of SSDCs since they were launched in 1998 and takes into 
account the fundamental change of the EU due to enlargement in 2004. Thus the empirical analysis 
covers SSDC agreements concluded in the EU-27 from May 2004 (the date of enlargement of the EU) 
to December 2013 (Degryse, 2015; European Commission, 2015) taking the overall structural 
capacity of social partners representing the EU-27 in SSDCs into account. 
 
4.3. Empirical analysis and results 
Table 2 shows the observed configurations of the 28 cases (i.e. sectors) and four conditions. In total 
16 different configurations of conditions were identified which are clearly associated with the 
outcome ‘agreement’. The MVQCA identified different configurations of factors for the eight 
industries for which SSDC agreements were concluded. In the following section these results are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
The conditions identified as being relevant for the outcome agreement in railway and 
hospitals are high trade union density in combination with high employer density and high frequency 
of meetings. The MVQCA identified alternative configurational explanation. The simultaneous 
presence of the conditions high employer density and medium collective bargaining coverage in the 
sea and coastal water transport sector display the outcome agreement, low collective bargaining 
coverage and frequent meetings were found to produce the outcome agreement in the sea fisheries 
sector, and low employer density produces the outcome agreement in the chemical sector.  Three 
more agreements were concluded in sectors representing different configurations of conditions. 
However, the same configurations of these cases also cover sectors for which no agreements were 
concluded. Such contradictory outcome affects sectors such as inland water transport, private 
security and personal services. In the case of inland water transport, sectors also covered by the same 
configuration of conditions (education and public administration), did not conclude agreements. 
Another contradictory configuration is found in sectors such as insurance, tanning and leather; an 
agreement was concluded only in the private security sector but not in other two sectors. These 
contradictory cases require further inspection.  
The results indicate that the absence of agreements in sectors (education and central 
government) that show the same configurations as inland water transport is produced by the 
configuration low employer density in combination with high collective bargaining coverage. In the 
case of the commerce sector, which shows the same configuration as personal services, the factors 
that are associated with the absence of the outcome agreement are low employer density and low 
collective bargaining coverage. In contrast, the absence of the outcome agreement in sectors showing 
the same configurations as private security is produced by the configuration medium trade union 
density in conjunction with high employers’ organisations density. Having looked at the structural 
conditions first, hospitals, railway infrastructure and sea and coastal water transport are 
distinguished by rather strong industrial relations structures across the EU-27, while chemical, inland 
water transport, personal services are distinguished by weak structures, and private security is 
characterized by relatively weak structures. Among those sectors characterised by relatively weak 
industrial relations structures, but displaying agreements, inland water transport and private security 
exhibit low EU-level engagement, while sectors such as chemical, personal service, and sea fisheries 
display high engagement,  
The findings highlight the importance of structural conditions in the conclusion of SSDC 
agreements, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for sectors characterised by low EU-level 
engagement. To analyse the role of engagement, the theoretical framework is augmented in order to 
explain the interrelationship between structural factors and engagement strategies across sectors by 
differentiating between four categories: ‘simultaneous engagement’, ‘traditional’, ‘compensation’ and 
‘disengagement’. 
 
4.4. Classification of sectors 
Five out of eight cases for which outcomes were concluded represent examples of high SSDC 
engagement and can be classified as examples of ‘simultaneous engagement’ and ‘compensation’. 12 
out of 20 sectors for which no agreements were concluded represent the ‘traditional’ and the 
‘disengagement’ categories in the analytical framework. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
Cases such as the railway and hospital sector clearly belong in the ‘simultaneous 
engagement’ category. These sectors are characterized by robust social dialogue structures across the 
EU in the sense that trade union and employer densities as well as collective bargaining coverages are 
high. In addition to this regular SSDC meetings can be observed. Therefore the conclusion of 
European agreements implies that this industry uses European dialogue in order to complement 
national activities and realise policy objective which may be difficult to achieve at national level. The 
civil aviation and the post and courier sector and electricity sector, in which regular SSDC meetings 
take place yet no agreements have been concluded since 2004, might also be assigned to this category. 
Also, as can be seen in Table 3, five out of eight sectors for which agreements have been concluded 
are characterized by high engagement in SSDC. Consequently, the other three sectors with 
agreements are characterized by low engagement. 
The agreements concluded in sectors assigned to the ‘compensation’ category are consistent 
with the premises of this category, which state that where trade unions and employers are not an 
integral part of national social dialogue systems they seek to compensate at European sectoral level. 
Sectors classified in the category ‘compensation’ and which did conclude EU-level agreements are 
chemical, personal service, and sea fisheries; these are sectors rather characterised by weak 
structures, i.e. relatively low employer and trade union density and low collective bargaining 
coverage, but high engagement in SSDCs. Though such industries exhibit rather weaker national 
social dialogue structures, regular SSDC meetings and the conclusion of agreements indicate that 
European-level dialogue assumes a compensatory role. The SSDC agreement concluded in the sea 
fisheries sector promotes the implementation of the International Labour Organisation Convention on 
work in this sector. In the case of the personal service sector social dialogue is to a large extent union 
driven.  
Other sectors occupy a more tentative position in this category. Agriculture, commerce, gas, 
horeca, and telecommunications are distinguished by rather underdeveloped social dialogue structures 
(in the sense that social partners’ densities can be considered to be medium) and regular SSDC 
meetings, yet the inability of these sectors to conclude agreements suggests that in general the extent 
to which they are able to compensate for weaker national dialogue structures is more limited.  
Cases representing the ‘traditional’ category are sectors where there is high collective 
bargaining coverage and trade unions and employers’ organisations are well organized in the sense 
that densities are relatively high and these organisations play integral roles at the national level. The 
banking, education, public administration, steel, and sugar sectors may be assigned to this category. 
Though robust national social dialogue structures exist in these industries in the EU-27 member states, 
infrequent SSDC meetings and the absence of agreements implies that social partners fail to take 
advantage of European social dialogue. The cases of inland water transport and sea and coastal water 
transport are more puzzling. The properties of these sectors are consistent with the ‘traditional’ 
category, yet agreements were concluded in both industries. As expressed in the interviews, 
explanations for the presence of agreements in this category are the EU-level relevance of issues and 
the importance of establishing shared standards in the EU-27 in order to prevent social dumping and 
unfair competition. 
Some attempts have been made by sectors such as education and public administration for 
which SSDCs were established in 2010. However, as in the case of public administration, not all 
countries engage in EU-level dialogue and as a consequence the framework agreement concluded in 
2010 is only binding for the 11 member states which so far take part in EU-level dialogue (Degryse, 
2015: 33). This agreement was therefore not considered in the analysis.      
By contrast, sectors in the ‘disengagement’ category are characterised by weak social 
dialogue structures in the sense that employers’ organisations and trade union densities and collective 
bargaining coverages are relatively low. Social partners in these cases lack necessary resources to 
engage effectively in social dialogue which explains the absence of engagement at European level and 
agreements. Sectors such as cleaning activity, footwear, insurance, metal, paper, tanning and leather 
and textiles and clothing are best positioned in the ‘disengagement’ category. Not only are there rather 
weak national social dialogue structures in these industries, but SSDC meetings are held infrequently 
and agreements were not concluded. In general, all sectors classified in the category ‘disengagement’ 
are ill-equipped to engage in both national and European social dialogue yet an exception is the 
private security sector. This sector concluded an autonomous agreement according to Article 155 
(TFEU) on issues of EU-wide relevance (i.e. training standards for staff carrying out cross-border 
transport of euro-cash (European Commission, 2015). A prominent example in the ‘disengagement’ 
category is metal. The metal sector is a traditional strong hold of industrial relations in the EU-15 
however, since enlargement in 2004 and based on a change in the structural capacity in EU-27 
countries, the metal sector has moved from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘disengagement’ category by the 
inclusion of CEE countries in the sample, with very few attempts to develop dialogue at the EU-level. 
An interviewee identified such challenges as the distribution of power between countries and lack of 
willingness to acknowledge legitimate interests of social partners. However, the fact that the 
categorization of sectors remains predominantly stable, independent from the country sample, 
supports the fact that industrial relations systems at sector level are more similar across countries than 
across sectors within countries (Bechter et al., 2012).  
The analysis of the relationship between the structural capacity of actors and their 
engagement practices between 28 sectors generally indicate that effective social dialogue demands 
strong actors and that strong trade unions are particularly crucial in compelling employers to engage 
in social dialogue. Findings on the relevance of meeting frequency are more complex. In some cases 
the compensation hypothesis, in which social partners ‘compensate’ for weak national structures at 
European-level, was confirmed and in such cases frequency of meetings appears to have made a 
difference in prompting the conclusion of an agreement. As highlighted in the interviews and 
according to previous literature, deeper cooperation requires a shared understanding of the relevance 
of topics (Larsson, 2012). As in the chemical and personal service sectors SSDC negotiations can lead 
to agreements if topics are of EU-wide relevance and social partners require EU-wide regulation. 
There are still cases equipped with the relevant structural capacity but these sectors tend to persist in 
seeking access to EU-policy making. They tend to prefer to regulate competition at the national level. 
The sectors classified in the ‘traditional’ category represent industries providing services to the 
national market and highly concentrated industries dominated by a few multinational employers. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The EC emphasizes the importance of adequate social partners’ structures for effective national and 
European social dialogue. However, little is known about which structures matter and stimulate 
effective engagement in European sectoral social dialogue. With regards to the structural capacity of 
social partners, our findings show that the combination of high organisational density of employers’ 
organisations and trade unions as well as high collective bargaining coverage are generally important 
and necessary factors which are clearly associated with the effective conclusion of SSDC agreements. 
However, these factors are not sufficient for the conclusion of agreements. Social partners at the 
European level act within structural constrains. Hence, coordinating national constituencies is difficult 
if they are strong with regard to their structural capacity but ‘persist’ in engaging in the work of 
SSDCs. Likewise, social coordination is challenging if constituencies in the EU are weak and 
therefore remain ‘disengaged’ at both the national and EU-level. This research provides some hope 
for sectors characterised by underdeveloped national social dialogue structures (represented in the 
‘compensation’ category); there is some evidence that EU-level engagement can result in agreements 
if there is a shared understanding of the relevance of issues and common interest among social 
partners to cooperate at EU-level. Given the heterogeneity of national contexts (economic and 
institutional), defining common positions is difficult. Social dialogue between the European social 
partners and their constituencies at the national level is thought to facilitate the development of shared 
understanding and cooperation. 
The findings generally highlight the importance of structural factors to achieve this; however 
strong social partners are not sufficient for the conclusion of SSDC agreements. Factors explaining 
the absence of agreements already point at possible implications for the implementation of 
agreements. Referring to the four categories in the analytical framework, both legally binding and 
non-binding agreements seem to be suitable for sectors where social partners play an integral part in 
the social dialogue system and engage in policy making simultaneously at national and EU-level 
(‘simultaneous engagement’ category), because of the structural capacity and engagement social 
partners are prepared to cooperate and to conclude and implement agreements autonomously. In the 
other categories neither cooperation nor successful implementation of agreements can be assured. On 
the one hand (voluntary) cooperation cannot be expected from sectors which are characterised by 
strong national structures and are trying to put their own strategies in place in order to gain 
competitive advantage (the ‘traditional’ category). On the other hand, in the absence of adequate 
structures the implementation of agreements concluded in sectors with ‘underdeveloped’ national 
social dialogue structures (the ‘compensation’ and ‘disengagement’ categories) is unlikely. Regarding 
the enforcement of agreements, legally non-binding agreements are not suitable for sectors classified 
in the ‘compensation’ and ‘disengagement’ categories because national social partners lack the 
capacity to achieve this.           
Since the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 there has been a trend to use soft law as a mode of 
European governance. In literature such soft approaches to regulate employment policy in the EU 
have been criticized for displacing legal instruments. Proponents of soft governance mechanisms 
emphasise the positive effect of soft law on promoting the social dimension of European integration; 
it is argued that such regulations may cause unintended impacts (Falkner et al., 2005; Perin and 
Léonard, 2016). Our findings indicate that, given structural constraints, centrally framed agreements 
that set out main principles but leave the determination of details to the national level may be neither 
successful nor sufficient for sectors in which industrial relations are weak.  
With regard to effective engagement and the governance of SSDC agreements, our findings 
rather favour the implementation of agreements through EU Directives over the use of autonomous 
agreements which are dependent on weak or absent national institutions. Hence, not all sectors benefit 
equally from more autonomy; in some cases autonomous agreements may encourage further 
decentralisation rather than the robust regulation of work and employment issues. National diversity 
must be taken into account when protecting national practice and standards from being undermined by 
European influences. Overall, there needs to be more political appetite for legally binding 
consultations of SSDCs, treaty-based enhancement of SSDC competencies, or more financial support 
for SSDCs so that the Europe 2020 strategy materializes. 
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Table 1: Factors stimulating engagement in European sectoral social dialogue  
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Strong Actors engage extensively with 
national and European social 
dialogue structures. 
 
Simultaneous engagement 
 
Actors rely mainly on national 
social dialogue structures to 
realise interests. 
 
 Traditional 
Weak Actors seek to compensate for 
poor national social dialogue 
structures at the European level  
 
Compensation 
Actors are disengaged at the 
national and EU-level. 
 
 
Disengagement 
 
 
  
Table 2: MVQCA truth table for period 2004-2013 for EU-27 and 28 sectors 
Conditions  Outcome   
Union density Employer 
density 
Bargaining 
coverage 
# Meetings  Agreement 
 Sectors 
Medium Low High Low  C  Education, inland water transport*, public administration 
Medium Medium Medium Low  No  Metal, paper 
Low Medium Low High  Yes  Sea fisheries* 
Medium Medium Low Low  No  Textile clothing 
Medium High Medium Low  C  Insurance, private security*, tanning & leather 
Low Medium Medium Low  No  Cleaning activity, footwear 
Low Medium Medium High  No  Horeca (Hotel/restaurant/catering) 
Medium High High High  No  Electricity, post & courier 
Low Low Low High  C  Commerce, personal services* 
Medium High High Low  No  Banking 
Medium Medium Medium High  No  Agriculture, telecommunications, gas 
High High High Low  No  Steel, sugar 
High Medium High High  No  Civil aviation 
High High High High  Yes  Hospital*, railway infrastructure*,  
High High Medium Low  Yes  Sea & coastal water transport* 
Medium Low Medium High  Yes  Chemical* 
 
Note: Categorisation of Union density: Low [<20%], Medium [20%-50%], High [>50%]; Employer density: Low [<40%], Medium [40%-60%], High 
[>60%]; Bargaining coverage: Low [<60%], Medium [60%-80%], High [>80%]; SSDC meetings: Low [<4 meetings], High [≥4 meetings]. C indicates 
contradictions in outcomes which means that the same configurations can lead to different outcomes in different sectors, i.e. Agreement {No; Yes}. Sectors 
with agreements are indicated by *.  
Source: Union density, employer density, bargaining coverage data are from Eurofound (2016), #meetings are from European Commission (2010) and 
European Commission – Social Dialogue Text Database. 
  
Table 3. Classification of engagement patterns for EU-27 and 28 sectors 
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Strong Civil aviation 
Electricity 
Hospital 
Post and courier 
Railway 
 
Banking 
Education 
Inland water transport 
Public administration 
Sea and coastal water transport 
Steel 
Sugar 
 
Weak Agriculture 
Chemical 
Commerce 
Gas 
Horeca 
Personal services 
Sea fisheries 
Telecommunication 
Cleaning activity 
Footwear 
Insurance 
Metal 
Paper 
Private security 
Tanning and leather 
Textile and clothing 
 
Note: Sectors in which agreements were concluded are marked in bold and sectors in which no agreements were concluded are marked by using italics. The 
categorization is based on Table 2 and sectors within each category are listed alphabetically. 
Table A1: Sector list and industrial relations indicators and SSDC agreements 
Sector NACE Formal 
SSDC 
Union 
Density 
Employer 
Density 
Bargaining 
Coverage 
SSDC Agreements 
(2004–2013) 
Agriculture  01 1999 23.9 58.5 68.7 No 
Banking  64 (except 64.11) 1999 34.3 72.1 82.1 No 
Chemical  20, 21, 22 2004 21.8 37.0 70.3 ‘Health and safety’ (2006) 
Civil aviation  62.1, 62.2, 63.23 2000 62.7 50.1 84.5 No 
Cleaning activity  81.2 1999 12.1 46.7 63.7 No 
Commerce  45, 46, 47 1999 5.9 24.0 57.8 No 
Education P.85 2010 32.7 25.1 88.1 No 
Electricity  35.1 2000 29.0 62.3 83.8 No 
Footwear 15.2.0 1999 19.9 49.1 74.8 No 
Gas  40.2 2007 47.5 41.8 78.1 No 
Horeca (Hotel/restaurant/catering)  55 (except 55.29) 1999 14.1 47.5 65.8 No 
Hospital  85.11 2006 55.8 64.6 82.7 ‘Health and safety’ (2009) 
Insurance  65.1, 65.2 1999 29.3 75.2 66.0 No 
Inland water transport  61.2 1999 33.0 31.0 82.8 ‘Working time’ (2012) 
Metal  C24, C25, C26, C27, C28 2010 22.7 46.0 73.9 No 
Paper  17.1, 17.2 2010 30.7 45.7 76.0 No 
Personal services  93.02 1999 15.0 32.1 43.7 ‘Training’ (2009) 
Post and courier services  64.11, 64.12 1999 45.3 67.1 81.0 No 
Private security  80.1 1999 22.9 63.8 66.5 ‘Training’ (2010) 
Public administration O.84 2010 44.4 21.8 86.9 No 
Railway  63.21 1999 63.7 68.9 94.7 ‘Working time’ (2004), 
‘Working conditions’ 
(2004), ‘Training’ (2009) 
Sea and coastal water transport  61.1 1999 67.2 71.2 66.6 ‘Working conditions’ 
(2008) 
Sea fisheries  03.11 1999 16.1 43.8 51.4 ‘Working time’ (2012) 
Steel  27.1 2006 64.8 68.8 88.6 No 
Sugar  15.83 1999 57.8 73.9 90.1 No 
Tanning and leather  19.1 2001 39.6 65.2 76.7 No 
Telecommunication  64.20 1999 44.6 52.0 73.3 No 
Textile and clothing  13, 14 1999 24.6 42.9 57.3 No 
Note: Column NACE shows Eurostat’s classification of economic activities. Column ‘Formal SSDC’ shows the year when the respective SSDC according to 
the Commission Decision (European Commission, 1998) was established. Average trade union, employers’ organisation density and collective bargaining 
coverage across countries defined in percentage terms (Eurofound, 2016). Column ‘Agreement’ shows the year and subject field of agreements concluded in 
the period 2004–2013. 
 
